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Chapter 5 
From Warriors of Empire to Martial Contractors: 
Reimagining Gurkhas in Private Security 
Amanda Chisholm 
We are known [as] the Gurkhas all over the world . . . People understand 
[the Gurkha] as loyal, honest, honorable, and disciplined. The Gurkhas are 
very well mannered, very good person[s], very energetic. Whatever 
instructions come down from higher we will obey.  
—Kivendra, May 2009 
It all comes down to the training. The raw material is key. The trick is the 
training that turns that raw material into someone who is incredibly 
disciplined and proud.  
—Tristan Forster, FSI Worldwide, September 2012 
The above quotations, one from an interview with a Nepalese man working as a Gurkha 
security contractor in private security in Kabul, the other with the director of a security 
company specializing in providing Gurkha security, speak to the notoriety Gurkhas have 
within international security and military realms.
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 They also speak to Gurkhas’ ascribed 
racialized attributes rooted in the British Empire’s colonial enterprise. Gurkhas, a group 
of men originating from the hills of Nepal and sharing over 200 years of military history 
with the British, have, like other militarized men from the global South, made their way 
into private security as racialized security laborers. Kivendra, and other men like him 
who I interviewed while I was in Kabul, are identified as Gurkhas because they are 
Nepalese nations who have served within the British or Indian militaries or the 
Singaporean Police. The security industry seeks out Gurkha men because of their long-
standing ties with western militaries; their racialized representations of being hard 
workers who follow orders; and their bravery, which, so the story goes, makes them more 
amenable to dangerous work. Labeled third-country nationals (TCNs) by security 
practitioners and academics, these men represent a growing labor force from the global 
South whose labor experiences are marked by increasingly fragile, dangerous, and 
flexible work. While some of these men are fortunate enough to garner management 
positions, most of them take up positions in static guarding and convoy protection. These 
positions are poorly paid, considered of lesser importance and are often more dangerous. 
Importantly, a homogenous TCN security experience does not exist. More accurately, it 
is defined by experiences that vary depending upon how the individual men associate 
with and measure up to the ideal (white) security contractor. While these men and their 
stories remain largely absent within the mainstream literature on private military and 
security companies (PMSCs), their representations and participation demonstrate how the 
industry rests upon and reproduces racial and gender hierarchies. 
This chapter examines Gurkhas who participate as TCNs in private security. 
Gurkhas are an interesting group of men to study. They are largely understood as martial 
men, deep-seated in colonial histories with the British Empire. Their notoriety has a 
global reach, and mention of them often brings up conflicting images of fierce little men 
who employ brutal tactics, yet are disciplined and loyal to their western superiors. It is 
these colonial attributes that make them an “easy sell” in the security industry, as well as 
set the terms under which they participate. Relying on colonial imaginings of martial 
race, security companies, agents, and Gurkhas themselves are all reconstituting the 
Gurkha in the realm of private security. Pictured as little men with kukris who adhere to 
their motto “Better to die than to be a coward,” exhibiting stealth in their movements and 
natural fierceness in battle, these men are revered for their loyalty, determination, and 
courage (Bullock 2009). For the security world, the martial Gurkhas are an ideal 
substitute for the expensive western contractor. Westerners love these men, enemies fear 
them, security companies make money off them, and their participation continues, at least 
in part, to be constituted through colonial martial histories. 
Focusing on gender and racial mechanisms within private security, this chapter is 
theoretically positioned within emerging scholarship in “critical gender studies in private 
military security” (see the introduction to this volume). Western PMSCs, western states, 
western security contractors, and western clients have been the main points of inquiry in 
critical gender studies in private military security. The experiences of men and women 
from the global South, and by extension, the intersectionalities of race and gender, have 
largely remained absent in this scholarship (with the exceptions of Barker 2009; 
Chisholm 2014a, 2014b; Eichler 2014; Higate 2012e; and Schneiker and Joachim as well 
as Barker in this volume). As a result, much of the emerging critical gender research 
inadvertently reinforces the discrete categories of global southern versus global northern 
men because it does not interrogate the practices that sustain this division. By bringing to 
the fore the particular techniques and histories that give rise and make intelligible 
particular security subjectivities, this chapter moves beyond reinforcing and naturalizing 
racial hierarchies. 
The chapter focuses on how Gurkhas understand and negotiate their positions as 
TCN security laborers. I use Gurkha experiences and histories to illustrate how Gurkhas’ 
lives were and continue to be intimately connected to the British military and to western 
security contractors. Drawing on interviews from my fieldwork in Afghanistan and 
Nepal, I argue that instead of looking at private security as a world constituted as white 
and western, or even as constituted by the dichotomy of global South/global North, 
private security industries should be understood as economies/worlds (Agathangelou and 
Ling, 2009) where men and women from a variety of histories and situational knowledge 
come together to produce and reproduce fragmented and hybrid subject positions. I ask 
how Gurkhas and Gurkha agents understand their subject positions and make sense of 
their relationships with each other and with the western men who they work alongside. 
This analysis reveals fragmented, interconnected, and hybrid martial security contractor 
subjects; each interviewee seeks different ways of understanding himself and others and 
attempts to find personal agency in an industry that works to marginalize them. 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into five sections. The first briefly details 
the challenges and opportunities my ethnographic fieldwork presented and offers an 
introduction to the men I interviewed. Second, I describe the theoretical gender concepts 
I employ to help me understand and analyze in what ways gender hierarchies are 
produced and how Gurkhas are complicit in these productions. Section three 
demonstrates the importance of Gurkhas’ colonial history not only in making these men 
intelligible to larger (mostly western) audiences but also in terms of how these men invest 
particular meanings into this history. The next section explores, through interview 
transcripts with Gurkhas, how racial logics underpinning Gurkhas’ colonial histories are 
reproduced in contemporary private security operations. The final section examines how 
the Gurkhas I interviewed make sense of and find meaning in their relationships with the 
British and their marginalized positions within private security markets. 
Studying Gurkhas through Ethnography 
Security markets, observed through recruitment and marketing, highlight the different 
value that is placed upon Gurkhas and their skill sets, yet, while these men are complicit, 
they also actively resist and adapt to market practices, using them for their own ends. 
This chapter draws upon the personal stories of Gurkhas who have worked or currently 
work as armed private security contractors. These accounts were gathered from in-depth 
interviews in both one-on-one and focus group formats, with 14 Gurkhas of British, 
Indian, or Singaporean military/police training. The interviews took place in Kabul, 
Afghanistan, and Kathmandu and Pokhara, Nepal, from January to July 2008 and 
September 2009 through May 2010. 
The interviews in Afghanistan were with Roshan, a young Indian military Gurkha 
who left military service to work with a security company in Afghanistan; Jitendra, a 
retired Singaporean police Gurkha who took up work in private security in Iraq and 
Afghanistan; a focus group with Fabien, Tek, and Tikaraj, three Indian Gurkhas who left 
service with the Indian military to work in private security; Rabindra, a retired Indian 
army Gurkha who currently works in Afghanistan; and Pun, a young Indian army Gurkha 
who left the Indian military to work in Kabul. Further interviews conducted in Nepal 
included a focus group with four former British military Gurkhas: Kivendra, Kitendra, 
Jitendra, and Randhoj. These men have worked in private security in Angola, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan but currently live in Nepal. The interviews were complemented by 10 
months of participatory observations of security contractors in Afghanistan. Combining 
observations with interviews allowed me to gain a deeper insight into how Gurkhas 
understand contending masculinities and representations of themselves and others within 
PMSCs. The research revealed complexities of identity formation, acts of resistance, and 
ways of seeking agency. 
Ethnography is a method that is used by many feminist scholars (Skeggs 2009). 
While a particular feminist ethnographic method does not exist, what makes 
ethnographies feminist is a focus on the ethical and political aspirations of specific 
research projects, borne out of feminism and feminist debates over epistemology, 
constructions of knowledge from multiple locations, and research ethics (Skeggs 2009, 
429; Hemmings 2012; J. Tickner 2013). As such, feminists have sought to situate 
themselves in their research (through participation and nonparticipant observations) and 
to write themselves into their research through reflexivity.
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 These strategies are applied 
with the political aspirations of disrupting power practices embedded in the research 
process and to draw upon the importance of the researcher’s positionality in 
understanding the meanings behind social concepts and the ways in which the research 
community has a stake in the research being produced (Skeggs 2009, 426; Hemmings 
2012). 
Conversely, even with the best feminist intentions to pay attention to gendered 
power relations, ethnography is not a perfect methodology and can reproduce the silences 
and inequalities the researcher seeks to expose (Vrasti 2008). Ethnography has a past 
deeply embedded in colonial knowledge production, which reinforced and perpetuated 
historical power imbalances. It was a central method used to understand and know the 
Gurkha at the time the British military sought to employ Gurkhas in its colonial army 
throughout Asia (Caplan 1995; Streets 2004). The irony of using a method that was 
integral to the initial shaping and knowing of Gurkhas and to positioning them as 
subordinate to the British in the very Gurkha communities I sought to understand, was 
not lost on me. 
We can stand to learn much about power by not only understanding the colonial 
history of ethnography but also by reflecting on how research is produced through 
intersubjectivities and practices of power in the interactions between the researcher and 
the researched (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 118; Pintchman 2009). Such a reflexive 
strategy requires one to pay attention to “how the researcher is socially situated, and how 
the research agenda/process has been constituted” (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002, 
118). Reflexivity also offers a trustworthy and dependable account of how research was 
produced. By placing oneself in one’s research, the reader is able to understand the 
particular set of social conditions and contexts that have led the researcher to her 
particular conclusions and analysis (Higate and Cameron 2006, 223). Through this, we 
“become answerable for what we learn and how we see” (Haraway 1988, 583, quoted in 
Gunaratnam 2003, 33). Not only does reflexivity offer a transparent account of our 
research, it also disrupts power practices and the privilege of the researcher that is 
embedded in all research projects (Skeggs 2009). 
To this end, it is worth noting that I am a white, English-speaking, middle-class 
Canadian woman. I have military experience—I served for five years in the Canadian 
Armed Forces (CAF) as a medical assistant. My background afforded me as many 
opportunities as it presented challenges. From the onset of my research I was an outsider 
to the Gurkha military family, a military family deep-seated in colonial history. With 
only four years to know the men constituted as Gurkhas, I could only begin to forge a 
relationship with and understanding of them and their histories. Yet my accounts and 
understandings of these men are mediated through my background as a white middle-
class Canadian woman with some military experience, and through my identification as 
an academic researcher with the men I interviewed. 
During my fieldwork, I was situated in a highly masculinized space (cf. Cohn 
2007, 97), predominantly containing men with former military experience working in 
private security. The insider community I was researching distinguished civilians from 
security contractors with military backgrounds, although this distinction became more 
dynamic and multilayered the more I became immersed in the community. My gendered 
subjectivity as a young civilian woman, seen as nonthreatening, allowed me certain 
access to security contractors and made me privy to conversations that others may have 
been excluded from. Specifically, many of the men I interviewed (either formally or 
informally) were very forthcoming with their personal experiences, insights about the 
security industry, their positions, and their understandings of Gurkhas in the industry. My 
status as a white, middle-class, and young female academic who was “out there” in 
Afghanistan garnered a lot of credibility, resulting in fairly substantial, generous, and 
forthcoming responses. 
Striking a Balance: Negotiations of Hegemonic Masculinities and 
Subaltern Masculinities 
Private security contractors are predominantly men and the industry is highly 
masculinized. Yet, as others in this volume also show, this does not mean that the 
security industry produces a monolithic understanding of masculinities or that all men in 
the industry have equal amounts of power. Marysia Zalewski (2010, 37) argues that a 
feminist engagement with masculinities reveals “the varying and contradictory ways that 
masculinities are weaved through the theories and practices of international politics.” V. 
Spike Peterson (2007, 10) explores masculinities in international relations by 
emphasizing “affective investments and the mutual constitution of subject formation.” 
Subject formation determines who we are, how we think, and what we do as men and 
women. Thinking through the intersections of gender, class, and race highlights how 
gender coding not only privileges some men but also how some masculinities are 
understood to be more appropriate than others (Peterson 2007). 
Masculinities within private security are constituted through colonial histories. 
These histories produce a hierarchy of men and masculinities demarcated largely along 
lines of the global North versus the global South. R. W. Connell (2005) is one of the 
pioneering scholars in masculinities studies who explores colonial gendered relations 
among men. Connell provides a historical gender analysis as she traces the violent 
practices that were carried out by westernized men (such as soldiers, sailors, traders, 
administrators, and missionaries) from the metropolis. The frontier masculinities 
embodied by these men often resulted in sexual exploitation of local women and in the 
establishment of new economic and administrative systems, significantly changing local 
men and masculinities through these processes (Connell 2005, 75; also see Fanon 1967; 
Streets 2004; Ouzgane and Morrell 2005; Morrell and Swart 2005). 
These colonial processes do not simply work top down, as local men negotiate 
their subject positions. The postcolonial masculinities literature tends to argue that the 
west (the white man) continues to exercise power over developing countries (nonwhite 
man) as a result of colonial legacies. Postcolonial masculinities and discourses 
surrounding them produce and sustain representations of gender and actual men “that 
serve to create, perpetuate and reinforce First World norms of masculinities and 
heterosexuality” as an ideal (Stanovsky 2007, 495). As indicated by Andrea Schneiker 
and Jutta Joachim in this volume, the archetypal security contractor continues in the 
image of the white, specially trained, western man. Yet, like the Gurkha, this image does 
not come into play without a history or an immediate relation to national and global 
politics in which the western security contractor finds himself. The dominant white, 
western contractor masculinities rely on colonial logics that constitute and, at the same 
time, silence racialized others. White men garner employment with PMSCs largely as a 
result of their experience with western militaries. Their years of service, military skills, 
and time spent in hostile environments determine whether they can move into 
commercial security in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. A part of the postcolonial 
commitment, as depicted by Agathangelou and Turcotte (2010), a commitment this 
chapter shares, is to demystify and denaturalize these seemingly geographically 
positioned global North (white) and global South (nonwhite) subjectivities and histories. 
Gurkhas, like the TCNs described by Jutta Joachim and Andrea Schneiker in this 
volume, are represented by the security industry as lacking the necessary (white) security 
skill sets to garner the higher paid and higher status security positions. Not only are their 
experiences considered nonstandard or out-of-date, the security managers and directors I 
interviewed maintained that the inability of Gurkhas to fluently converse in English 
impeded their ability to effectively communicate with clients. Similarly, many security 
company country managers in Kabul expressed a need for security contractors to 
maintain a competency in English business culture, which meant a security contractor 
could easily converse with a client, exude confidence in their ability to protect (even if 
they were not overly confident), understand sarcasm and humor, and socially relate to 
westerners (author’s communications with PMSCs representatives from IDG Security, 
CRG, AEGIS, ASI Security, and FSI Worldwide Jan.–Jul. 2009). This desired skill set 
reinforces the white security contractor as the ideal and positions the TCN as forever 
lacking. 
Where western security contractors are valued as a result of their military training 
and acquired professional skills, Gurkhas are valued on the basis of their raw/natural 
talents, which have been further refined through their military experience. The distinction 
is important as Gurkhas continue to be seen as raw security contractor talent, not highly 
skilled professionals. In interviews and conversations, when I asked why martial men are 
more suitable TCN security labor, industry practitioners and managers in Afghanistan 
and Nepal pointed to these men’s military training and biological martial attributes, 
which are seen to provide them with discipline and the ability to handle (without 
complaint) the monotony of long hours standing in front of buildings or driving vehicles 
in remote (and often hostile) settings. 
Such representations of Gurkhas can also be found on Gurkha security company 
websites. The rebranded representations of Gurkhas, drawing upon a shared military 
history with the British and reinforcing their raw and natural martial talents and physical 
robustness, appear on a variety of PMSC websites such as Gurkha Security Services, G4S 
Gurkha Services, and Everest Security. These companies’ websites, like popular books 
about Gurkhas, illustrate to the public audience who Gurkhas are and how they are to be 
understood.
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 They also underscore the historical martial roots of Gurkhas either through 
direct quotations from former British officers or through colonial images of these men. 
The consistent message is that Gurkha men carry timeless virtues of bravery, heartiness, 
and loyalty. It is the repeated references to the long martial history and association of 
Gurkhas with the British that commodifies Gurkhas into unique martial TCNs, made 
intelligible through their shared colonial history with the British. 
Colonial Imaginings: The Beginnings of the Gurkha 
The British began to know and define Gurkhas as martial during their military and 
colonial operations along the Nepalese border in the early nineteenth century. British 
officers at the time wrote about these “mysterious hill men” with admiration for their 
military skill and ridicule for their lack of military equipment. As British colonial 
expansion came in direct conflict with Nepalese expansionist policies, the British finally 
went to war against Nepal in 1814. It was during this two-year war that the Gurkha 
martial race was constructed and documented by the British. Most documented was how 
these “fierce men” could hold up against such a formidable British force for so long with 
very little military equipment. British military writers claimed their natural fierceness, 
commitment, and fortitude accounted for their bravery in battle (Pemble 1971; Caplan 
1995; Coleman 1999; Bullock 2009). 
After the war, the British identified biological fierceness in certain communities 
of Nepalese men and actively recruited them under the Nepalese government’s radar. A 
Nepalese man who sought employment with the British Indian army would travel across 
the Nepalese border into India (Des Chene 1991). Here he would be measured, weighed, 
and assessed based on notions of sexual prowess, martial performance, and cultural 
heritage (Tucker 1957; Coleman 1999). Despite the belief of British officers in Gurkhas’ 
martial abilities and their loyalty to the British, Gurkhas were only used in small numbers 
and regiments within the British Indian army. During the Great Sepoy Mutiny in May of 
1857,
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 the Gurkhas proved their loyalty to the British by refusing to side with the Bengal 
army mutineers and Indian national deserters. It was after this mutiny, and in subsequent 
battles, that the Gurkha reputation for being martial, disciplined, loyal, fierce, and 
subservient to the British was solidified (Coleman 1999; Roy 2001). For British officers 
fighting alongside Gurkhas, Gurkhas “would in every way be [a] more efficient, 
courageous and trustworthy body of men than any to be had in the plains” (E. 
Drummend, magistrate of Dinajpur, quoted in Smanta 1996, 25). Both military writings 
of Gurkha valor and the scientific classification of Gurkhas were coupled with specific 
institutional practices involving detailed dress, histories of recruitment, and military 
ceremonies (Caplan 1995; Streets 2004; Kochhar-George, 2010). Military writings of 
their valor during war throughout Europe, Asia, and Southeast Asia further entrenched 
the popular representation of the Gurkha as the gentleman soldier who was steadfast, 
fierce, and feared by the enemy but kind, loyal, and hospitable to his British leaders. In 
fact this representation of the Gurkha remains so strong today that, as Cross and Gurung 
(2007, 27) succinctly capture, Gurkhas are not inherently fearless but are afraid to show 
fear. These writings, ideologies, and institutional practices turned racialized men into a 
race of men. 
The construction of martial men was not simply a process whereby the colonizer 
bestowed practices and images upon the colonized men. Gurkhas were complicit in the 
construction of their reputations and identities. These men were able to economically 
provide for their families and their communities through employment with the British and 
Indian armies (Enloe 1981; Des Chene 1991). Lionel Caplan (1995) argues that the 
employment of Gurkhas with the British Indian army resulted in substantial social 
changes in the villages to which they returned. These men were able to challenge the 
social hierarchy founded in class/caste structures in Nepal—often to the frustration of 
Nepalese elites (Caplan 1995; Des Chene 1991). They did this by returning from a career 
with the British military with a pension that allowed them to economically move up the 
class hierarchy, which was very difficult to achieve in Nepal (Caplan 1995). Many 
Gurkhas built expensive homes and financially supported their communities. Their ability 
to provide financially increased their status, and this status continues today, as a sense of 
exceptionalism amongst Gurkhas was repeatedly highlighted in my interviews. 
While the number of Gurkhas in the British military service is decreasing, their 
popularity in the Indian army remains unquestionable (Khalidi 2001/02). Gurkhas’ 
martial notoriety also provides them an easy entry into private security. Interestingly, 
with their entry into private security, newly emerging representations of the Gurkha are 
coming to the fore. The colonial and seemingly static understanding of these men is, in 
fact, unstable. The new privatized Gurkha identities are constructed through a dynamic 
and relational process involving Gurkhas, their agents, security companies, and clients 
who consume their racial representations. All these actors work to produce hybrid forms 
of collective and individual Gurkha identities. 
From Martial Men to Racial Contractors 
Often Gurkhas are recruited for armed security work through word of mouth. 
Recruitment is established in regions of the country that are known to have large Gurkha 
settlements, and very few recruitment agents publicly advertise. The Nepalese Gurkha 
agents are in positions of power, acting as gatekeepers for Nepalese men seeking 
economic opportunities with western security companies. Many Gurkhas working with 
PMSCs have served in the Indian military and have to seek out Gurkha security agents in 
Nepal to assist them in gaining employment in private security. For these men, finding 
reputable agents can be difficult and can have drastic implications for their work 
experiences abroad. Some more fortunate Gurkhas access the security industry through 
immediate connections with British national white men, formerly Gurkha officers in 
British military Gurkha regiments, who are in management positions with security 
companies. 
Sante, an Indian Gurkha with 22 years of military experience, was new to the 
private security industry. In our interview he talked about the circumstances of his 
recruitment: “I placed my document in Kathmandu, and then the man there told me that 
this man from [the] UK was coming, and I should come for [an] interview.” Sante’s wife 
agreed to let him work abroad for a limited time, although he wanted to stay in 
Afghanistan as long as his contract would allow. Sante was recruited through a company 
that solely works with Gurkhas. The owner, a former British Gurkha officer working with 
the Singaporean police Gurkhas, started his business with the aspiration to create job 
opportunities for Gurkhas in the private security sector. Sante managed to find 
employment via an agent working directly for this security company, and Sante remained 
quite positive about his working conditions and experiences. 
Other Nepalese men were not as fortunate as Sante and had to go through third-
party agents to get contracts in Afghanistan. These Gurkhas experience a higher risk of 
exploitation from the agents. Sante explained that “agents are getting a bunch of money 
from these men and these men’s families to get over here and then have [few] 
opportunities.” He further commented that “the Nepali Gurkha is so happy that someone 
will get him a job and will immediately trust . . . him.” As Sante surmised, it is important 
to be vigilant. Another interviewee, Fabien, further described how finding the right agent 
has immediate implications on one’s living and working conditions while in Afghanistan. 
He stated that “sometimes work opportunities promised are OK, and sometimes they are 
not. Sometimes a Gurkha is staying at a local camp and we need money and we call our 
family [to] please send us 1,000 dollars [because] we are hungry. Sometimes there are 
visa problems, and the Gurkha is sent to jail.” For many Gurkhas, the agent remains the 
vital link for contract opportunities. 
This vital link opens up space for the Gurkha contractor to be exploited. Both 
security managers in Afghanistan and Gurkhas themselves told me in great detail of 
Nepalese men who pay considerable amounts of money to come to Afghanistan for work. 
Once they arrive in the country, they are often without the proper work visa and have no 
support in finding employment (Gurkha focus group in Kabul, Feb. 2010). Interviewees 
also told stories of Nepalese farmers who came to Afghanistan and had been promised 
jobs as Gurkha security contractors, but found themselves without work, work permits, or 
cash, yet owed an agent back in Nepal a lot of money. Bishal, a Gurkha agent working in 
Afghanistan, had met many men in this precarious situation and commented on the 
overall economic and political concerns these men face: 
You know [that it is difficult to work] in this market nowadays. 
Everywhere guys are cheating each other. Gurkhas [trust too easily and 
invest] a lot of money to come [to Afghanistan]. When they get here they 
find themselves without the proper documentation to work. So many guys 
come to me because they have lost a lot of money, [owe their respective 
agents, and have no means to pay their debts]. They meet me because I 
have a registered company, and I try to get them a job. Unscrupulous 
agents are easily cheating Gurkhas over here, and we [don’t have] any 
embassy or consultancy [to aid these Gurkhas]. Our embassy is in 
Islamabad in Pakistan, and sometimes we deal with them [but it remains 
difficult]. If we run into a problem, we have no one to take care of 
ourselves. 
Conversely, not everyone obtained work through agents. In a focus group with 
Jitendra and Randhoj, they detailed that the men who had served as British Gurkhas or in 
the Singaporean police relied on their relationships with their former British commanders 
who were employed in private security (referred to in interviews as their second career in 
security). Jitendra explained: 
I did not have such a problem. First my second career was [in] Angola . . . 
there was a British major, a retired major that served in our own regiment, 
and we went through him. We had no problem and no payment . . . not 
even a single payment . . . and [a] second [position] in Yugoslavia, no 
problem. The same major came here as well . . . I went to Afghanistan by 
the time a British guy came and I interviewed and they said: “We like you 
and we will take you there but you have to pass your medical. It will cost 
you 3,000 rupees, and once you passed you will be reimbursed.” But I 
have no knowledge of [contractors who pay agents and experience labor 
exploitation]. So I went through the British people. I didn’t pay any 
money. This is my story. 
While some men can secure a contract without paying, they continue to rely on colonial 
relations. As Jitendra commented, “my old commander request[ed] me . . . [to] come 
here. [I responded:] OK, I will go sir, I will obey your orders.’” Order, loyalty, and 
discipline for the British officer were important factors that secured Jitendra work in the 
security industry. 
It is not only the relationships with British and western company managers that 
are important in determining the type of contract and conditions of possibility that 
Gurkhas have access to within the industry. Gurkhas are also assessed on the basis of 
their military skills, an assessment that relies on the ideal western military contractor. 
Bharat, a former British Gurkha who owns a Gurkha manpower agency that provides 
Gurkhas for larger security companies, discussed in detail how Gurkhas are assessed for 
private security. Bharat classified Gurkhas into three categories: A, B, and C. Category A 
refers to Gurkhas from the Nepalese military or with Indian army experience. These 
Gurkhas are seen to have limited ability to converse in English and are primarily hired for 
security work in Nepal or India but may also go to Afghanistan. Category B refers to 
Gurkhas who speak English well and who worked primarily for western clients. They 
earn a salary of 750 USD to 1,000 USD a month and are often contracted to places in 
Africa. Category C was reserved for Gurkhas who excelled in their professional 
background as well as in their ability to converse in English. These men would go to the 
highest-paid positions with clients in Bahrain and Afghanistan. These men could 
command anywhere from 900 USD to 2,000 USD a month. 
In contrast, when it comes to unarmed security, the image of Gurkhas is much 
more fluid and the guidelines for recruitment are much less strict. In the unarmed security 
market, women can also be contracted as Gurkhas. Quatta, a former Gurkha stationed in 
Hong Kong and now an owner of a security company in Nepal, marketed both men and 
women in unarmed security. Quatta went into business with a former British Gurkha 
officer who also worked with Gurkhas in Hong Kong. These men specialize in providing 
unarmed Gurkhas to cruise lines. Quatta claimed that Gurkha, as a historical colonial 
image of a fierce soldier coming from a landlocked country, was not a difficult sell to the 
cruise lines. For his company, he and his British officer counterpart stressed the 
trustworthiness, heartiness, and loyalty attributes of the Gurkha. These attributes could 
transcend gendered bodies, and therefore both women and men were actively recruited. 
Negotiating “Almost but Not White”: Gurkhas’ Understandings of 
Self and Other 
Gurkhas’ experiences of being recruited and vetted validate and reproduce a white 
privilege within the industry. Consequently, much of Bhabha’s (2004, 122) analysis into 
the colonial relationship and mimicry whereby the colonial subject is constituted “as a 
subject of difference that is almost the same but not quite” resonates here. Gurkhas, like 
other TCNs as detailed by Joachim and Schneiker in this volume, continue to be “almost 
but not white.” They are positioned in relation to their white security contractor 
counterparts. The white contractors assume the benchmark for which Gurkhas are 
measured against and their value as security labourers determined. The men who have a 
closer personal relationship with their white managers or who closely mimic the 
archetypal white security contractor in skill sets and behaviors enjoy more opportunities 
and material benefits then their Gurkha counterparts. However, as a result of Gurkhas’ 
colonial reputations and exotic subject positions, no Gurkha could ever be constituted as 
the same as their white counterparts. Gurkhas’ positions within PMSCs are reminiscent 
of Bhabha’s (1994, 122) concept of “almost the same but not quite.” This concept is used 
to describe the ambivalent position of the colonized vis-à-vis his white colonizer other, 
where ambivalence both ruptures and creates alternative spaces in the colonial discourse. 
Gurkhas’ ambivalent relations to their western others illuminates the colonial tension 
upon which colonial enterprise rests—tension that attempts both to fix Gurkhas as natural 
martial and to transform (modernize) them into exceptional (almost white) security 
contractors. 
Each Gurkha I interviewed dealt differently with the almost-but-not-white 
position in the security industry. They were all proud of their Gurkha history, and, at the 
same time, they recognized their subordinate status vis-à-vis their white counterparts. 
Overall, interviewees reinforced the ideal of the white western security contractor, yet 
there was not much support for the vast material differences between Gurkhas and 
westerners. In many of my interviews, Gurkhas expressed a general frustration with how 
security companies were using the Gurkhas’ global reputation and selling them as ideal 
while paying them very little in comparison to westerners. Murat explained: “I don’t 
know why there is such a big difference in pay and living . . . I know the British are 
[better] educated than us and are more professional than us and in that case the salary 
could be different. But in some cases, Nepalese are talented and educated but even they 
are not getting that salary.” The pay was not the only source of frustration, interviewees 
also felt that they were not treated as well once they were working in Afghanistan and 
had little negotiating power to improve their conditions. Here Fabien commented: 
It is fine, not bad, but there is also huge discrimination between expats 
[westerners] and third-country nationals in the salary and also the living 
and clothing is different. Like the expats used to stay in [single] room[s], 
and we are staying in one room for five to six people. There is different 
dining and different food and different drinks. Whatever food is in the 
kitchen they [the westerners] can take whenever they want but we cannot. 
We have specific times. Always one food, same meal every day. 
The Gurkhas who did not completely accept the colonial logics of difference in living and 
working conditions were additionally frustrated over their inability to change their 
immediate situation. For example, Rabindra rhetorically asked: “I feel bad, but what to 
do?” He claimed he could not raise concerns because “if you do you will be kicked out.” 
Many Gurkhas appeared to have an overall frustration with the global private security 
industry and their lack of agency within its structure. Rabindra commented on this 
situation: “The security companies are getting the contracts because of the Gurkha. They 
convince their clients that we are good, but these same companies have cheated us. This 
is because they are using your name and yet you are treated completely different.” 
How Gurkhas understand their representations and experiences within private 
security is far from simple. Many move into private security work because it offers them 
not only financial incentives, regardless of the significant pay gap between them and their 
western counterparts, but also a space to claim and live their martial masculinities. For 
Gurkhas like Tek and Fabien, working in private security reinforced their martial 
attributes as being somehow biological. Being a Gurkha, they felt, was in their blood, and 
it was a calling. These men believed and stated that there was something exceptional 
about their martial status. For them, white men had to be trained, whereas the Gurkha had 
natural attributes that only needed to be harnessed. Gurkhas could learn certain skills 
from their white mentors, but those white men could never have the natural warrior spirit 
that was in the Gurkha bloodline. Their masculinities were wrapped up in a warrior 
understanding of self and a sense of natural physical strength and mental courage in 
battle, things extensively written about in many Gurkha officer memoirs.
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These Gurkhas drew upon their reputations for uncompromising bravery to 
redefine their subordination as TCN security contractors. It allowed them to construct an 
identity as strong martial men; men who were stronger and braver than a lot of white 
westerners who worked from fortified places, whereas the Gurkhas sought work in 
dangerous parts of Afghanistan and Iraq. J. P. Cross and Buddhiman Gurung (2007), in a 
detailed discussion of interviews with retired Gurkhas, provide a thought-provoking 
analysis of how, while Gurkhas are not fearless, their fear of showing fear is strong (27). 
The authors cite one Gurkha claiming: “[I]f you think you’ll get back home, you’ll be no 
use in war. You’re only any use if you think you won’t get back” (26). This quotation and 
others like it place a great deal of emphasis on the resolve to face death. The men I 
interviewed shared similar stories, passed down by their fathers, uncles, and grandfathers. 
Their understanding of their masculinity and of what it means to be a Gurkha is wrapped 
up in histories and long-held views of how to behave in the face of violence and possible 
death. Showing fear was simply not an option. 
The brave and fierce imagery of Gurkha embodied in this particular masculinity 
helps Gurkhas cope with dangerous incidents they encountered in their private security 
work. When I asked Kavijdra how he felt about performing dangerous tasks in 
Afghanistan, he stated that “we are already Gurkhas, and this is how they [our 
forefathers] got their name.” Recounting the Gurkha motto, Kavijdra continued: “[I]t is 
better to die than to be a coward. We are also afraid of dangerous things, but we have to 
still put the name Gurkha forward and do these dangerous jobs. Because my grandfather 
and father [have] done this, so we have to.” Not wanting to tarnish the Gurkha reputation, 
this man accepted most tasks his employer assigned him. Rather than not being afraid, he 
was determined not to show fear (cf. Cross and Gurung 2007; also Des Chene 1991). For 
most of the men I interviewed, fear was something to suppress in order to perform their 
jobs. Exposure to violence and danger were articulated as part of the job—a job they 
freely signed onto and that their fathers and grandfathers had performed. Fear was also 
not to be shown in private spaces with family. In many interviews, Gurkhas working in 
Afghanistan claimed to downplay the level of potential violence to their family in order 
to ease family concerns. One interviewee claimed that there was no need to feel fear since 
Gurkha bravery kept them safe. He then explained that, to the date of the interview, there 
had not yet been a Gurkha fatality. Any feelings of fear were reassured and silenced by 
affirming the formidable martial attributes of the Gurkha, which provided them with 
bravery and kept them alive. 
Some Gurkhas I interviewed expressed a commitment to taking more dangerous 
work in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to protect their white managers. They felt they 
were in a better position to protect white contractors because of their better cultural 
understanding of Afghans (being Asian and nonwestern) as well as their martial roots. 
The gendered divide between the male protector and female protected discussed by Judith 
Hicks Stiehm (1982) is being challenged in private security practices (Higate 2011; also 
see Eichler’s and Higate’s chapters in this volume). My research suggests that the 
protector/protected relationship is more dynamic than the male/female dichotomy 
indicates. Specifically, the protector subjectivity is used by Gurkhas to reclaim their 
martial masculinities, which have been devalued by their subaltern status in private 
security markets. Cynthia Enloe (2007, 93–115) pays particular attention to the ways 
feminization is used to devalue and humiliate particular men (as in the case of the Abu 
Ghraib torture and abuse scandal) but does not focus on how feminization is also used by 
the devalued and racialized man to reclaim his own authority, self-respect, and dignity. 
Interviews with white British national, former Gurkha officers within British military 
Gurkha regiments, who are now security company owners, and with Gurkhas themselves, 
indicate that both groups of men use the protector/protected discourse to assert their own 
masculinities. British Gurkha officers feminize Gurkhas by retelling colonial histories, 
marking Gurkhas as underdeveloped and in need of mentoring. They further feminize 
them in the security industry by stating that these men need Gurkha officers to provide 
them with economic opportunities and manage them properly—reducing the potential for 
them to be exploited by unscrupulous Nepalese agents. In response, Gurkhas feminize 
their western managers by assuming the protector role in operations on the ground in 
hostile environments. These men reclaim their masculinities (and their self-respect) by 
appropriating the devalued roles of static guard and convoy protection, arguing that it is 
their instincts and knowledge of local culture, not their feminized, devalued skill sets, that 
position them in these peripheral and dangerous places. They are in these places to 
protect their western managers. The potential for violence and exposure to danger 
reinforced for many of the men interviewed their martial masculinities. It offered them a 
space to regain authority and practice power in the protection of their western managers 
and clients. 
Conversely, other Gurkhas recognized the paradoxical and unstable nature of their 
representation and participation in the industry. Men like Jitendra and Randhoj saw the 
security industry as something short term and as a sacrifice in order to provide an 
education for their children. Jitendra spoke highly of his four daughters and one son, 
three of them at universities in the United States and Australia. He was very impressed 
that I was doing a PhD. For him, education meant a better material life because it enabled 
more opportunities in the global market. Education was the tool required to financially 
take better care of your family and community. He stated that he had become a Gurkha 
because he had failed in school. When I asked him if he encourages his son to become a 
Gurkha, he said that he did not talk to his son much about his work because he would 
prefer him not to become a Gurkha. Jitendra continued: “Without education you cannot 
get anything. If you can’t study, you don’t have a future. So what I did for my children 
[is] I did a time set. You come from school you have to eat then you have to study, and I 
always check their homework and their bags to make sure they are good. I always go to 
see their teachers and the principal to see how they are doing.” Jitendra expressed a 
sincere desire to have the Gurkha martial identity end with him. Others interviewed such 
as Bharat and Randhoj agreed with his point of view. Yet for others, Gurkha identity lay 
somewhere in-between a realized commodified construction necessary to meet family 
educational needs and something biological or a calling within them. A few men I 
interviewed over a period of several months told me that they were proud of their Gurkha 
service and bragged about being part of a particular regiment. They did not necessarily 
see being a Gurkha as something in their blood but as something deeply rooted in their 
family or community history. Whilst Gurkhas have been constructed through colonial 
practices and imagery, they believe that they continue the Gurkha reputation through 
their conduct during military service and through their work in private security. 
Gurkhas Constituting Private Security Worlds: Concluding 
Thoughts 
Exploring Gurkhas through a postcolonial frame allows us to see the myriad subject 
positions of private security contractors. The preceding analysis highlights the pervasive 
nature of colonial logics that continue to operate in the background of the industry by 
framing the conditions of possibility for men working in private security. While the 
example of Gurkhas shows that the security industry benefits from and works to sustain a 
heavily racialized form of governance, it also shows that there is room for resistance and 
appropriation. Interrogating not only why these men participate but also how they, while 
at the margins, use their ingenuity to achieve “the good life” is an important line of 
inquiry if we want to see alternative ways of being. 
The interviews show that being a Gurkha is associated with the ability to provide 
financially for one’s family. It also affirms masculinity and access to authority. It 
provides a valuable sense of history and pride, an identity that offers comfort and strength 
in the physically dangerous situations in which Gurkhas find themselves through their 
private security work. While their martial history and identity as a Gurkha provides these 
men with esteem and a sense of belonging, they nonetheless have to negotiate the 
pecking order in the international security market. While some men successfully claim 
their self-worth by assuming the role of protector and by enduring the violence that many 
expats do not expose themselves to, their vulnerability and the hierarchy of labor are 
revealed when they become physically injured and are unable to continue to work. The 
lack of social networks and programs, found in most western countries but unavailable to 
them as Nepalese nationals, makes their ability to work even more paramount and means 
any loss of work through injury is to be feared. 
Like other martial men, such as Fijians and Chileans, Gurkhas continue to access 
private security markets as a result of their martial race (in contrast to other men from the 
global South who might be denied access and perform reproductive labor instead, see the 
chapter by Barker in this volume). Their marketability is attributed to their long history of 
military service involving exemplary courage and commitment to the British military as 
well as the discourse centering on Gurkhas as cheaper and therefore desirable alternatives 
to white westerners. Their employment in private security is being disrupted in 
Afghanistan through the employment of other racialized contractors such as Ugandans 
and Fijians. Fijians in particular are increasingly garnering contracts in private security in 
Iraq and Afghanistan largely because of the same discursive basis that brands the 
Gurkhas (MacLellan 2007). 
The rise of alternative martial men comes at a time when Gurkhas are becoming 
more politically mobilized and are fighting for equal treatment in Nepal and in the UK. 
Certainly their understanding of inequalities, their research, and their mobilization afford 
them the chance to settle in the UK, to advance educational and employment 
opportunities for their children, and to allow them better life choices within Nepal. 
Unfortunately, their individual and group mobilizations do not appear to be dismantling 
the oppressive system that provides marginal opportunities to subaltern men. As Gurkhas 
seek greater political and economic opportunities for themselves and their families, 
another racialized group—one that is willing to work under worse conditions than the 
Gurkha—will likely come to fill their role in the neoliberal private security market. 
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 Both quotations are from author interviews. 
2 
Feminist ethnography has been informed by debates within feminism more generally 
that are historically situated. Skeggs (2009, 429) for example details how during 
the 1980s radical feminism informed feminist ethnography and the point of 
ethnography was to research and write women into male-stream knowledge and 
knowledge production. Today, a poststructural understanding of gender and the 
importance of seeing how social categories of women and men relate to 
ideologies of masculinities and femininities inform much feminist research. 
3
 The Gurkha Security Services’ website (http://gurkhasecurityservices.co.uk) details the 
services they offer within the UK. It also makes reference to Gurkha martial 
attributes and their origins in the Anglo-Nepalese war. The Everest Security’s 
website (http://www.everestsecurity.co.uk) also points the viewer to the Gurkhas’ 
martial attributes and makes reference to the “colonial” Gurkha through black-
and-white photos of Gurkhas serving in the British colonial army. Like Gurkha 
Security Services, the services that Everest Security offers involve not only 
security but also cleaning services, largely geared to the UK client. The Global 
Gurkha Security Services’ website (http://globalgurkhasecurity.com) draws 
                                                                                                                                                                             
attention, through images, not to colonial histories but to more recent Gurkha 
military experience in contemporary British military operations. They, like the 
two aforementioned companies, employ British Gurkhas and appear largely for 
the UK audience. Finally, the G4S Gurkha Services website 
(http://www.g4s.uk.com/gurkhaservices/) draws attention to Gurkhas’ 
management style and notes that all managers are former British army officers. 
The images associated are more modern and do not make reference to colonial 
Gurkha histories yet cite their martial attributes of discipline and honor. 
4
 The Great Sepoy Mutiny refers to an internal Bengal army revolt as a result of growing 
religious and labor grievances the Indian nationals had against their British 
officers. It resulted in a mass deserting of Indian nationals from the Bengal army 
and an armed revolt. The British revere Gurkhas during this mutiny for their 
loyalty to the British and their taking up arms against the Indian mutineers. 
Military historians and British Gurkha officers alike refer to this mutiny as the 
defining moment where Gurkhas martial attributes and their loyalty to the British 
were cemented in history. For further details of the mutiny and changing British 
attitudes toward mass recruitment of Gurkhas into the British Indian army, please 
refer to Bullock (2009, 28–41) and Coleman (1999, 197). 
5
 See, for example, Parker (1999), Cross and Gurung (2007), and Bullock (2009). 
